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#### Our interpretation is the aff has to answer the question of the resolution by engaging the legal system

#### Statutory restrictions mandate legal change

Kershner 2010

(Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81 This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89 The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause. All of the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate. n92 Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives. n93 Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism, construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96 The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

#### So do judicial restrictions

Singer 2007

(Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

#### Prefer our interpretation –

#### A. Limits – there are an infinite number of ways to engage the topic – just winning one of the four parts of the resolution is bad skews the debate too far toward the affirmative – being tied to the stem ensures the negative predictable ground within the literature – that is key to debate

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as ~~human~~ beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Legal Education - Debating and topic-preparation enhances student familiarity with legal complexity

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377

A debate exercise provides students with deeper insights into and appreciation of the complexities of integrating international law into the foreign policy making process. The success of any given debate depends upon the quality of the team members' efforts to research and present a topic, and on their ability to relate concepts and principles of international law to the ways in which foreign policy objectives are formulated and achieved. The exercise is not intended to train international lawyers or to promote forensics as a skill, but rather to give undergraduate political science students a greater sense of the real-world process by which foreign policy is made and implemented, and of the place international legal considerations must be given in that process. In this way, the relevance and reality of international law can be more effectively demonstrated for students of political science in general and of international relations theory in particular.

#### And, you should prioritize practical paths to agency – structural strategy trumps discursive education

David McNally (prof. PoliSci at York University) 1997 *in defense of history: marxism and the postmodern agenda* p. 26-27

We are witnessing today a new idealism, infecting large sections of the intellectual left, which has turned language not merely into an independent realm, but into an all pervasive realm, a sphere so omnipresent, so dominant, as virtually to extinguish human agency. Everything is discourse, you see; and discourse is everything. Because human begins are linguistic creatures, because the world in which we act is a world we know and describe through language, it allegedly follows that there is nothing outside language. Our language, or “discourse,” or “text” – the jargon varies but not the message – defines and limits what we know, what we can imagine, what we can do. There is a political theory here too. Oppression is said to be rooted ultimately in the way in which we and others are defined linguistically, the way in which we are positioned by words in relation to other words, or by codes which are said to be “structured like a language.” Our very being, our identities and “subjectivities,” are constituted through language. As one trendy literary theorist puts it in David Lodge’s novel *Nice Work*, it is not merely that you are what you speak; no, according to the new idealism, “you are what speaks you.” Language is thus the final “prison-house.” Our confinement there is beyond resistance; it is impossible to escape from that which makes us what we are. This new idealism corresponds to a profound collapse of political horizons. It is the pseudoradicalism of a period of retreat for the left, a verbal radicalism of the word without deed, or, rather, of the word *as* deed. In response to actual structures and practices of oppression and exploitation, it offers the rhetorical gesture, the ironic turn of phrase. It comes as little surprise, then, when one of the chief philosophers of the new idealism, Jacques Derrida, tells us that he “would hesitate to use such terms as ‘liberation’” 1 Imprisoned within language, we may play with words; but we can never hope to liberate ourselves from immutable structures of oppression rooted in language, itself. The new idealism and the politics it entails are not simply harmless curiosities; they are an abdication of political responsibility, especially at a time of ferocious capitalist restructuring, of widening gaps between rich and poor, of ruling class offensives against social programs. They are also an obstacle to the rebuilding of mass ~~movements~~ of protest and resistance.

#### Specifically, legal focus on this topic is necessary to prevent cooption

Mellor 2013

[Ewan, European University Institute, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why\_policy\_relevance\_is\_a\_moral\_necessity\_Just\_war\_theory\_impact\_and\_UAVs\]

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51

### 2

#### The affirmative’s attempt to proliferate cultural knowledge production of Malcolm X will be incorporated into the system and sold as a new market for capital’s infiltration. Their framing certainly does not resist capitalism commodification. Despite the best intentions, Difference and identity can and must only be understood from a class-based perspective. This is key to creating a successful break from the system of capital

D’Annibale and McLaren 2004(Valerie Catamburio, PhD, chairs the Graduate Program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor, and Peter, professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of "Race" and "Difference”,” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 148-175 (2003))

Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses¶ of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary¶ to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical¶ formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference¶ that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation¶ enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches¶ to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose¶ between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization,¶personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics”¶ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class¶ (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the¶ changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the¶ meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the¶ importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific his torical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in¶ relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of¶ capitalism.¶ Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony.¶In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater¶ cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a¶ demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a¶ neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In¶ short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom¶ amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods.¶A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim¶ is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid¶ claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture....[This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the¶ page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional¶ forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 150)¶ This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of¶ particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of¶ difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural¶ embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity,¶ race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of¶ tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy¶ for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue.¶What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of¶ diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain¶ within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism¶ of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of¶ ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference,¶ diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests¶ precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the¶ self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the¶ uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also¶ lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical¶ conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests¶ the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton¶ (1996) sardonically commented on the implications:¶Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held¶ myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that¶ we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is¶ a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127)¶ The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a¶ plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class.¶Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to¶ inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to¶ champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the¶ 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly¶ incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a¶ posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of¶ capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted¶ that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations.¶He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven¶ property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can¶ there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232-¶ 233).

#### **The 1AC’s affirmation of Islamic scholarship stifles the revolution by reframing the struggle to religious terms. Only by remaining faithful to the idea of the revolution NOW can allow for a true break**

Weslati 2011 **[Hager,**  lecturer in Critical Theory and American Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Kingston University, London, **May 2011** The Arab Minotaur: A People Deferred, <http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=3301#more-3301> ]

In Badiou’s recent lighthearted philosophical dialogue with a fictional *street*philosopher (*Liberation*, 29 March 2011), the events in Libya are described as a global conflict whereby the whole world is “taken over by a planetary banditry.” A helpless citizenry is caught up in the crossfire of the “civilized godfathers” and the rogue bandits that they have created and nurtured in the less civilized parts of the world. There is no revolution in Libya. Just a few “desert oil wells” and a “desert colonel boss” fighting “little groups going round in four-wheel drives brandishing submachine-guns… and riding pell-mell through the desert to seize townships that no one defends.” The people’s protest that only a few weeks ago Badiou recommended that the West needs to listen to and learn from has already exhausted its revolutionary potential. It is worth noting though that neither Badiou nor his interlocutor, the street philosopher, had anything to say about the motley crowd of Yemeni protestors in head-rags and flip-flops who have been occupying the streets and public squares day and night for over a month now in a ~~Mexican stand-off~~ with their resilient septuagenarian president. Perhaps the Yemenis, like their public square, are not as telegenic as their Egyptian counterparts. In a different context, Badiou’s ‘planetary banditry’ resonates with Derrida’s*voyoucracy* qua a “principle of disorder… a threat against public order.” But unlike Badiou, Derrida identifies new spaces and misrecognized opportunities within both language and the place at the very moment of their collapse. A *voyoucracy*, Derrida says, “institutes a sort of counter-power or counter-citizenship. It is… a*milieu*.” The protest of a quarter of a million in the streets of London on March 26 would have been deemed a success, had it not been hijacked by a small minority of anarchists. Such is the media narrative of events and the political response to it. The success of the march would simply mean that nothing happened and nothing will happen. The emptying of the street (from action, the law and the third person subject) is the ‘spatial collapse’, which in Badiou’s words summons a transcendent master who confers a poetic chance on some truth, on an impossible choice. Is the radical distinction between street and public opinion, street and reason, street and the law, street and action symptomatic of the defection of language and the defection of the place in Western politics? Is this double defection an instance of what Benjamin describes as moral metaphors of bourgeois language? This language, Benjamin says, is incapable of bringing about change. The language Benjamin was trying to recover in various textual fragments and montages is one where words and images “come about through action”. Images and words “are action” which takes place in the Messianic time of the now and the present. The protest ~~movements~~ derived their legitimacy and energy from the Arab street rather than from a holy book or a divine command. According to Tunisian psychoanalyst, Fethi Ben Slama, Islamic discourse is symptomatic of modernity as that moment of crisis which engenders totalitarian ideologies. This discourse in its recent alliance with the discourse of science and technology “presents itself as the end that returns to the beginning, a new beginning that makes origin infinite. This closed circuit makes messianism impossible.” The protests which have lead the Arab Minotaur across labyrinthine streets are perhaps an affirmation of the NOW, a present which has erupted within a history of deferred dreams trapped between an oppressive past of lost glories and the ~~crippling~~ uncertainties of a utopian future.

#### The invocation of Malcolm X’s leaning is nothing more than an example of the status quo liberal multicultural leaning upon the past. The liberal inclusion of Islamic populations only extends so much as they conform to Western notions. This no longer applies when they act outside this realm their way of life is deemed Evil and disposable – this makes emancipation impossible

Zizek 2011 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia, “Europe must move beyond mere tolerance”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/25/european-union-slovenia)

In a similar way, many liberal warriors are so eager to fight anti-democratic fundamentalism that they end up flinging away freedom and democracy themselves. If the "terrorists" are ready to wreck this world for love of another world, our warriors on terror are ready to wreck their own democratic world out of hatred for the Muslim other. Some of them love human dignity so much that they are even ready to legalise torture – the ultimate degradation of human dignity – to defend it. And does the same not hold also for the recent rise of the defenders of Europe against the immigrant threat? In their zeal to protect the Judeo-Christian legacy, the new zealots are ready to forsake the true heart of the Christian legacy: that each individual has an immediate access to the universality of the Holy Spirit (or, today, of human rights and freedoms); that I can participate in this universal dimension directly, irrespective of my special place within the global social order. Christ's "scandalous" words from Luke point in the direction of a universality which ignores every social hierarchy: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and his mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters – yes even his own life – he cannot be my disciple" (14:26) Family relations stand here for any particular ethnic or hierarchic social link that determines our place in the global order of things. The "hatred" enjoined by Christ is therefore not the opposite of Christian love, but its direct expression: it is love itself that enjoins us to "disconnect" from our organic community into which we were born, or, as St Paul put it, for a Christian, there are neither men nor women, neither Jews nor Greeks. No wonder that, for those fully identified with a particular way of life, the appearance of Christ was perceived as ridiculous or traumatic. But the impasse of Europe reaches much deeper. The real problem is that the critics of the anti-immigrant wave, who should defend this precious core of the European legacy, instead tend to limit themselves to the endless ritual of confessing Europe's own sins, of humbly accepting the limitations of the European legacy, and of celebrating the wealth of other cultures. The famous lines from William Butler Yeats's Second Coming render perfectly our present predicament: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity." This is an excellent description of the current split between anaemic liberals and impassioned fundamentalists, Muslim as well as our own, Christian. "The best" are no longer able fully to engage, while "the worst" engage in racist, religious, sexist fanaticism. How can we break out of this deadlock? A recent debate in Germany may indicate the way. Last October, the chancellor, Angela Merkel, declared at a meeting of young members of her conservative Christian Democratic Union: "This multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and live happily with each other, has failed. Utterly failed." With this, she was echoing the debate about Leitkultur (the dominant culture) from a couple of years ago, when conservatives insisted that every state was based on a predominant cultural space which the members of other cultures who live in the same space should respect. Instead of bemoaning the newly emerging racist Europe, such statements announce, we should be self-critical, asking to what extent our own abstract multiculturalism contributed to this sad state of things. If all sides do not share or respect the same civility, then multiculturalism turns into legally regulated mutual ignorance or hatred. The conflict about multiculturalism already is one about Leitkultur: it is not a conflict between cultures, but between different visions of how different cultures can and should co-exist, about the rules and practices these cultures have to share if they are to co-exist. One should thus avoid getting caught in the liberal game of "how much tolerance can we afford": should we tolerate it if they prevent their children going to state schools? If they force their women to dress in a certain way? If they arrange marriages or brutalise gay people? At this level, of course, we are never tolerant enough, or we are already too tolerant, neglecting the rights of women, gay people etc. The only way to break out of this deadlock is to propose and fight for a positive universal project shared by all participants. Struggles where "there are neither men nor women, neither Jews nor Greeks" are many, from ecology to the economy. Some months ago, a small miracle happened in the occupied West Bank: Palestinian women who were demonstrating against the wall were joined by a group of Jewish lesbian women from Israel. The initial mutual mistrust was dispelled in the first confrontation with the Israeli soldiers guarding the wall, and a sublime solidarity developed, with a traditionally dressed Palestinian woman embracing a Jewish lesbian with spiked purple hair – a living symbol of what our struggle should be. So, perhaps, the Slovenian Eurosceptic missed the point with his Marx brothers sarcasm. Instead of losing time with the costs and benefits analysis of our membership in the EU, we should focus on what the EU effectively stands for. Mostly, it acts as a regulator of global capitalist development; sometimes, it flirts with the conservative defence of its tradition. Both these paths lead to oblivion, to Europe's marginalisation. The only way out of this debilitating deadlock is for Europe to resuscitate its legacy of radical and universal emancipation. The task is to move beyond mere tolerance of others to a positive emancipatory Leitkultur which can sustain authentic co-existence. Don't just respect others, offer a common struggle, since our problems today are common.

#### This debate is about competing methodologies. The question at the end of the debate is whose ethical orientation best catalyzes political organization against Capital. They have chosen Malcolm X and we have chosen the Communist Hypothesis. Vote negative to affirm the Communist Hypothesis as a prerequisite to political or personal calculations, which ensure that discussions in debate continue to operate from within a broader framework of capitalistic competition

Badiou 2009 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate … ,*The Meaning of Sarkozy*, pgs. 97-103 bb)

I would like to situate the Sarkozy episode, which is not an impressive page in French history, in a broader horizon. Let us picture a kind of Hegelian fresco of recent world history - by which I do not, like our journalists, mean the triad Mitterrand-Chirac-Sarkozy, but rather the development of the politics of working-class and popular emancipation over nearly two centuries.¶Since the French Revolution and its gradually universal echo, since the most radically egalitarian developments of that revolution, the decrees of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety on the 'maximum' and Babeuf's theoriza­ tions, we know (when I say 'we', I mean humanity in the abstract, and the knowledge in question is universally available on the paths of emancipation) that communum u the right hypothuu. Indeed, there is no other, or at least I am not aware of one. All those who abandon this hypothesis immediately resign themselves to the market economy, to parliamentary democracy - the form of state suited to capitalism - and to the inevitable and 'natural' character of the most monstrous inequalities.¶What do we mean by 'communism'? As Marx argued in the 1844ManUJcriptJ, communism is an idea regarding the destiny of the human species. This use of the word must be completely distinguished from the meaning of the adjective 'communist' that is so worn-out today, in such expressions as 'communist parties', 'communist states' or 'communist world' - never mind that 'communist state' is an oxymoron, to which the obscure coinage 'socialist state' has wisely been preferred. Even if, as we shall see, these uses of the word belong to a time when the hypothesis was still coming-to-be.¶In its generic sense, 'communist' means first of all, in a negative sense - as we can read in its canonical text The CommunutManijeJto - that the logic of classes, ofthefunda­ mental subordination of people who actually work for a dominant class, can be overcome. This arrangement, which has been that of history ever since antiquity, is not ipevitable. Consequently, the oligarchic power of those who possess wealth and organize its circulation, crystallized in the might of states, is not inescapable. The communist hypothesis is that a different collective organization is practicable, one that will eliminate the inequality ofwealth and even the division of labour: every individual will be a 'multi-purpose worker', and in particular people will circulate between manual and intellectual work, as well as between town and country. The private appropriation of monstrous fortunes and their transmission by inheritance will disappear. The existence of a coercive state separate from civil society, with its military and police, will no longer seem a self-evident necessity. There will be, Marx tells us - and he saw this point as his major contribution - after a brief sequence of 'proletarian dictatorship' charged with destroying the remains of the old world, a long sequence of reorganization on the basis of a 'free association' of producers and creators, which will make possible a 'with­ ering away' of the state.¶'Communism' as such only denotes this very general set of intellectual representations. This set is the horizon of any initiative, however local and limited in time it may be, that breaks with the order of established opinions - the necessity of inequalities and the state instrument for protect­ ing these - and composes a fragment of a politics of emancipation. In other words, communism is what Kant called an 'Idea', with a regulatory function, rather than a programme. It is absurd to characterize communist principles in the sense I have defined them here as utopian, as is so often done. They are intellectual patterns, always actualized in a different fashion, that serve to produce lines of demarcation between different forms of politics. By and large, a particular political sequence is either compatible with these principles or opposed to them, in which case it is reactionary. 'Communism', in this sense, is a heuristic hypothesis that is very frequently used in political argument,¶even if the word itself does not appear. If it is still true, as Sartre said, that 'every anti-communist is a swine', it is because any political sequence that, in its principles or lack of them, ~~stands~~ in formal contradiction with the communist hypothesis in its generic sense, has to be judged as opposed¶ to the emancipation of the whole of humanity, and thus to the properly human destiny of humanity. Whoever does not illuminate the coming-to-be of humanity with the communist hypothesis - whatever words they use, as such words matter little - reduces humanity, as far as its collective becoming is concerned, to animality. As we know, the contemporary - that is, the capitalist name of this animality - is 'competition'. The war dictated by self-interest, and nothing more.¶As a pure Idea of equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed in a practical state since the beginnings of the existence of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of egalitarian justice, we have the appearance of rudiments or fragments of the communist hypothesis. This is why, in a pamphlet titled De l'uJeologie, which I wrote in collaboration with the late lamented Fran<;oisBalmes and was published in 1976, we proposed to identifY 'communist invariants'.2 Popular revolts, such as that of the slaves led by Spartacus, or that of the German peasants led by Thomas Munzer, are examples of this practical existence of communist invariants.¶ However, in the explicit form that it was given by certain thinkers and activists of the French Revolution, the commu­ nist hypothesis inaugurates political modernity. It was this that laid low the mental structures of the ancien regime, yet without being tied to those 'democratic' political forms that the bourgeoisie would make the instrument for its own pursuit of power. This point is essential: from the beginning, the communist hypothesis in no way coincided with the 'democratic' hypothesis that would lead to present-day parliamentarism. It subsumes a different history and different events. What seems important and creative when illuminated by the communist hypothesis is different in kind from what bourgeois-democratic historiography selects. That is indeed why Marx, giving materialist foundations to the first effective great sequence of the modern politics of emancipation, both took over the word 'communism' and distanced himself from any kind of democratic 'politicism' by maintaining, after the lesson of the Paris Commune, that the bourgeois state, no matter how democratic, must be destroyed.¶Well, I leave it to you to judge what is important or not, to judge the points whose consequences you choose to assume against the horizon of the communist hypothesis. Once again, it is the right hypothesis, and we can appeal to its principles, whatever the declensions or variations that these undergo in different contexts.¶Sartre said in an interview, which I paraphrase: If the communist hypothesis is not right, if it is not practicable, well, that means that humanity is not a thing in itself, not very different from ants or termites. What did he mean by that? If competition, the 'free market', the sum of little pleasures, and the walls that protect you from the desire of the ~~weak~~, are the alpha and omega of all collective and private existence, then the human animal is not worth a cent.¶And it is this worthlessness to which Bush with his aggressive conservatism and crusader spirit, Blair the Pious with his militarist rhetoric, and Sarkozy with his 'work, family, country' discipline, want to reduce the existence of the immense majority of living individuals. And the 'Left' is still worse, simply juxtaposing to this vacant violence a vague spirit of charity. To morbid competItIOn, the pasteboard¶ victories of daddy's boys and girls, the ridiculous supermen¶ of unleashed finance, the coked-up heroes of the planetary¶ stock exchange, this Left can only oppose the same actors¶ with a bit of social politeness, a little walnut oil in the wheels,¶crumbs of holy wafer for the disinherited - in other words,¶ borrowing from Nietzsche, the bloodless figure of the 'last man,.¶ To put an end once and for all to May '68 means agreeing that our only choice is between the hereditary nihilism of finance and social piety. It not only means accepting that communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, not only acknowledging that the PartiCommuniste Fran<;ais has been wretchedly defeated, but also and above all it means abandoning the hypothesis that May '68 was a militant invention precisely aware ofthe failure ofstate 'communism'. And thus that May '68, and still more so the five years that followed, inaugurated a new sequence for the genuine communist hypothesis, one that always keeps its distance from the state. Certainly, no one could say where all this might lead, but we knew in any case that what was at stake was the rebirth of this hypothesis.¶If the thing that Sarkozy is the name of succeeds in imposing the necessity of abandoning any idea of a rebirth of this kind, if human society is a collection of individuals pursuing their self-interest, if this is the eternal reality, then it is certain that the philosopher can and must abandon the human animal to its sad destiny.¶ But we shall not let a triumphant Sarkozy dictate the meaning of our existence, or the tasks of philosophy. For what we are witnessing in no way imposes such a renunciation of the communist hypothesis, but simply a consideration of the moment at which we find ourselves in the history of this hypothesis.

#### This round is key – every act of discussion must be understood as a point of metaphoric condensation for Communism. Voting negative means the assuming with full ethical force that the battle is already won.

**BADIOU2010** [ALAIN, The Communist Hypothesis Translated by David Macey and Steve Corcoran 2010 p 252-257

Let's recapitulate as simply as possible. A truth is the political real. History, even as a reservoir of proper names, is a symbolic place. The ideological operation of the Idea of communism is the imaginary projection of the political real into the symbolic fiction of History, including in its guise as a representation of the action of innumerable masses via the One of a proper name. The role of this Idea is to support the individual's incorporation into the discipline of a truth procedure, to authorize the individual, in his or her own eyes, to go beyond the Statist constraints of mere survival by becoming a part of the body-of-truth, or the subjectivizable body. We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous operation? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact - often a violent one that IS accompanied by different versions of the 'cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an exception but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain mea'mre of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle - husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues - that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one person or another's entry into the bodyoftruth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found - to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what i s impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real political meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw.But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism - must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion with four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice.The fiveperson meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure.

## 2NC

### Alt Solves the Aff

#### The global system of capitalism is the root cause of racial stratification in the squo

Kovel, 2002 [Joel Kovel**,** Alger Hiss Prof. At Bard, 2002 The Enemy of Nature, Zed Books, p. 123-125]

If, however we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially [hu]man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable — indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.’0 Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman’s labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional.

#### We must have the courage to reinvent and remain faith to the idea of communism. The world of the status quo is not necessary and should be abolished. This radical starting point is good enough to create possibilities for new politics

**BADIOU 2010** [ALAIN, The Communist Hypothesis Translated by David Macey and Steve Corcoran 2010 p 62-67

Having closed that parenthesis, we can say that we are still struggling with the difficult questions raised by May '68. We are the contemporaries of '68 from the point of view of politics, the definition of politics, and the organized future of politics. I therefore use the word 'contemporary' in the strongest possible sense. Of course, the world has changed, and of course categories have changed. The categories 'student th" k ' d " h' you , workers an peasants now mean sometlng different, and the union and party organizations of those days are now in ruins. But we have the same problem, and are the contemporaries of the problem revealed by May '68: the classical figure of the politics of emancipation was ineffective. Those of us who were politically active in the 1 960s and 1970s did not need the collapse of the USSR to teach us that. Countless new things have been experimented with, tried out and tested both in theory and in the practices that are dialectically bound up with it. And it still goes on thanks to the energy of a handful of activists, intellectuals and workers - and no distinction is made between them - who appear to be working in isolation. They are the guardians of the future and they are inventing the future. But it cannot be said that the problem has been resolved: what new forms of political organization are needed to handle political antagonisms? As in science, until such time as the problem has not been resolved, you have all sorts of discoveries stimulated by the search for a solution. Sometimes, and for the same reason, whole new theories see the light of day, but the problem itself is still there. We can define our contemporaneity with May '68 in similar terms. It is another way of talking about our fidelity to May '68. The decisive issue is the need to cling to the historical hypothesis of a world that has been freed from the law of profit and private interest - even while we are, at the level of intellectual representations, still prisoners of the conviction that we cannot do away with it, that this is the way of the world, and that no politics of emancipation is possible. That is what I propose to call the communist hypothesis. It is in fact mainly negative, as it is safer and more important to say that the existing world is not necessary than it is to say, when we have nothing to go on, that a different world is possible. This is a question of modal logic: how, in political terms, can we move from non-necessity to possibility?Because quite simply, if we accept the inevitability of the unbridled capitalist economy and the parliamentary politics that supports it, then we quite simply cannot see the other possibilities that are inherent in the situation in which we find ourselves. Second, we have to try to retain the words of our language, even though we no longer dare to say them out loud. In '68, these were the words that were used by everyone. Now they tell us: 'The world has changed, so you can no longer use those words, and you know that it WIL'S the language of illusions and terror.' 'Oh yes, we can! And we must!' The problem is still there, and that means that we must be able to pronounce those words. It is up to us to criticise them, and to give them a new meaning. We must be able to go on saying 'people', 'workers', 'abolition of private property', and so on, without being considered has-beens, and without considering ourselves as has-beens. We have to discuss these words in our own field, in our own camp. We have to put an end to the linguistic terrorism that delivers us into the hands of our enemies. Giving up on the language issue, and accepting the terror that subjectively forbids us to pronounce words that offend dominant sensibilities, is an intolerable form of oppression. And finally, we have to realize that all politics is organized, and that the most difficult question is probably that of what type of organization we need. We can resolve it through the multifaceted experiments that begin in '68. For the classic party dispositif, and its social supports, the most important 'battles' were in fact electoral battles, and that is a doctrine that has given all it can give. It is worn out and no longer works, despite the great things it was able to achieve or promote between 1900 and 1960. We have to discuss our fidelity to May '68 on two levels. At the ideological and historical level, we should draw up our own balance sheet for the twentieth century, so that we can reformulate the emancipation hypothesis in contemporary terms, now that the socialist states have failed. And we also know that new local experiments and political battles are going on, and that they will provide the backdrop that will create these new forms of organization. This combination of complex ideological and historical work, and theoretical and practical data about new forms of political organization, is the defining feature of our times. I would readily describe this as the era of the reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Then what is the virtue that means most to us? You know that the revolutionaries of 1 792-94 used the word 'virtue'. Saint-Just asked the crucial question: 'What do those who want neither virtue nor terror want?' His answer was that they wanted corruption. And that indeed is what today's world asks of us: to accept the wholesale corruption of minds under the yoke of commodities and money. The main political virtue we need to fight that now is courage. Not only courage when we face the police - though we will certainly find that - but the courage to defend and practice our ideas and principles, to say what we think, what we want, and what we are doing.To put it in a nutshell: we have to be bold enough to have an idea.A great idea.We have to convince ourselves that there is nothing ridiculous or criminal about having a great idea. The world of global and arrogant capitalism in which we live is taking us back to the 1840s and the birth of capitalism. Its imperative, as formulated by Guizot, was: 'Get rich!' We can translate that as 'Live without an idea!' We have to say that we cannot live without an idea. We have to say: 'Have the courage to support the idea, and it can only be the communist idea in its generic sense.' That is why we must remain the contemporaries of May '68. In its own way, it tells us that living without an idea is intolerable. And then a long and terrible resignation set in. Too many people now think that there is no alternative to living for oneself, for one's own interests. Let us have the courage to cut ourselves off from such people. I am a philosopher, so let me tell you something that has been said again and again since Plato's day. It is very simple. I am telling you as a philosopher that we have to live with an idea, and that what deserves to be called a real politics begins with that conviction.

#### Our ethico-political obligation is to assume responsibility for our actions. Capitalism render’s its victims anonymous and ensures that the aff’s personal focus never come to terms with the billions of degraded life choices globally—our epitstemological position is a PREREQUISITE to understanding the full extent of accessibility concerns.

Slavoj Zizek and Glyn Daly, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, 2004, Conversations With Zizek, p. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord­ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subju­gated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con­cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor­bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of im­plicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi­tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economismwe should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight thatin order to create a uni­versal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its constructionthrough a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is thatthe gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its out­comes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diver­sity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and name­less (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag­nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ­ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus­tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against thisZizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par­ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

### Perm

#### The affirmative makes notion of class just another marker like racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. This makes it impossible to access anti-capitalism

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2000, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 95-97

Let me, then, take a closer look at Laclau’s narrative which runs from Marxist essentialism the proletariat as the universal (lass whose revolu­tionary mission is inscribed into its very social being and thus discernible via ‘objective’ scientific analysis) to the ‘postmodern’ recognition of the contingent, tropological, metaphorico-metonymic, link between a social agent and its ‘task’. Once this contingency is acknowledged, one has to accept that there is no direct, ‘natural’ correlation between an agent’s social position and its tasks in the political struggle, no norm of devel­opment by which to measure exceptions say because of the weak political subjectivity of the bourgeoisie in Russia around 1900, the work­ing class had to accomplish the bourgeois-democratic revolution itself. My first observation here is that while this standard post— modern Leftist narrative of the passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism with the proletariat as the unique Historical Subject, the privileging of economic class struggle, and so on, to the postmodern irreducible plu­rality of struggles undoubtedly describes an actual historical process, its proponents, as a rule, lease out the resignation at its heart the accept­ance of capitalism as ‘the only game in town’, the renunciation of any real attempt to overcome the existing capitalist liberal regime. This point was already made very precisely in Wendy Brown’s perspicuous observation that ‘the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain renaturalization of capitalism’. The crucial question to be asked is thus: to what extent a critique of capitalism is foreclosed by the current con­figuration of oppositional politics, and not simply by the ‘loss of the socialist alternative’ or the ostensible ~triumph of liberalism’ in the global order. In contrast with the Marxist critique of a social whole and Marxist vision of total transformation, to what extent do identity politics require a standard internal to existing society against which to pitch their claims, a standard that not only preserves capitalism from critique, but sustains the invisibility and inarticulateness of class — not incidentally, but endem­ically? Could we have stumbled upon one reason why class is invariably named but rarely theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra, ‘race, class, gender, sexuality’?1 One can describe in very precise terms this reduction of class to an entity ‘named but rarely theorized’: one of the great and permanent results of the so-called ‘Western Marxism’ first formulated by the young Lukics is that the class-and-commodity structure of capitalism is not just a phenomenon limited to the particular ‘domain’ of economy, but the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion. This global dimension of capitalism is sus­pended in today’s multiculturalist progressive politics: its ‘anti-capitalism’ is reduced to the level of how today’s capitalism breeds sexist/racist oppression, and so on. Marx claimed that in the series production—distribution —exchange—consumption, the term ‘production’ is doubly inscribed: it is simultaneously one of the terms in the series and the structuring principle of the entire series. In production as one of the terms of the series, production (as the structuring principle) ‘encounters itself in its oppositional determination’,’2 as Marx put it, using the pre­cise Hegelian term. And the same goes for the postmodern political series class—gender—race…: in class as one of the terms in the series of particular struggles, class qua structuring principle of the social totality encounters itself in its oppositional determination’.3 In so far as post­modern politics promotes, in effect, a kind of ‘politicization of the economy’, is not this politicization similar to the way our supermarkets which fundamentally exclude from their field of visibility the actual production process (the way vegetables and fruit are harvested and packed by immigrant workers, the genetic and other manipulations in their production and display, etc.) — stage within the field of the dis­played goods, as a kind of ersatz, the spectacle of a pseudo-production (meals prepared in full view in ‘food courts’, fruit juices freshly squeezed before the customers’ eyes, etc.)?’5 An authentic Leftist should therefore ask the postmodern politicians the new version of the old Freudian question put to the perplexed Jew: ‘Why are von saving that one should politicize the economy, when one should in fact politicize the economy?’ So: in so far as postmodern politics involves a ‘[t]heoretical retreat from the problem of domination within capitalism’, it is here. in this silent suspension of class analysis, that we are dealing with an exemplary case of the mechanism of ideological displacement: when class antagonism is disavowed, when its key structuring role is suspended. ‘other markers of social difference may come to hear an inordinate weight; indeed, they may hear all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that attributable to the explicitly politicized marking”7. In other words, this displacement accounts for the somewhat ’excessive’ way the discourse of postmodern identity politics insists on the horrors of sexism, racism, and so on -- this ‘excess’ comes from the fact that these other ‘-isms’ have to hear the surplus-investment from the class struggle whose extent is not acknowledged.’8

### Multiculturalism

#### Liberal Multiculturalism is the status quo – the 1AC doesn’t challenge the structures that make cooption impossible – the Liberal system will include the 1AC to say “yes we shouldn’t mark black and brown bodies for drone strikes so the system is fixed” our argument is that the 1AC merely buys into this liberalism – Our Zizek evidence says that the only way to break from this is to begin from the point of Universal Radical Emancipation – only then can we prevent cooption

#### We have a disad to your specific framing – it gets coopted within the liberal democratic order

Wright 2000[Paul Academic journal article from *Social Justice*, Vol. 27, No. 3, The Cultural Commodification of Prisons, http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-73040921/the-cultural-commodification-of-prisons

One aspect of cultural commodification is its ability to co-opt, neutralize, and render powerless any challenges to the economic and political status quo. In this way, cultural hegemony is enforced. Rock and roll music, characterized in the 1960s as the music of protest and rebellion, became, within 20 years, the music of selling beer, tennis shoes, and cars. Even revolutionary activist Malcolm X has been commodified and marketed as a fashion statement. This ability to tam anything into a commodity, and make a profit doing so, contributes to the short collective political memory in capitalist consumer societies.While culture as a commodity tends to be upbeat and cheerful (happy, optimistic people buy more), it also has its darker side. Few people question the policy choices that have led to the objectively abnormal situation that constitutes mass imprisonment (and the rise in executions). The commodification of prisons as culture has contributed to normalizing the abnormal. Prison as Concept and RealityThe social and physical reality of prisons is constantly mystified and mythologized. Incarceration is a tool of social control. Its purpose is to discipline those workers and poor people who are not imprisoned, yet. Each prisoner serves as an example of what could happen to the other 150 Americans who are not currently imprisoned. The intimidation and deterrence factor of prison is served by keeping it distant, remote, and unknown, but at the same time, nearby, an immediate threat of imaginable evil. On the surface, these seem to be contradictory and impossible goals.Amazingly, American pop culture has largely succeeded in having it both ways, while simultaneously ensuring the belief in the general population of nonprisoners that what occurs in prisons does not affect them. Popular culture, mainly through film and television, but also with cheer leading from the corporate media and opportunistic politicians, has ingrained two conflicting images of prison into the collective American consciousness. When it is for the purpose of social control, to get the weak and poor into line, prison is the dark, barred world of brutal, sweaty, muscled, tattooed men, a world of sodomy, stabbings, and razor wire.

### Alt Indict

#### Badiou is not intolerant of difference—he just does not think that it should be fetishized as politics.

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Does Badiou's suspicion of the ethics of difference imply a hostility to difference as such? No. On the contrary, differences are simply the stuff of which the world is made. The point, rather, is that fetishizing difference is as ideological as the cruel attempt to suppress it. As we saw in Badiou's version of Saint Paul, any truth will simply be indifferent to such differences that exist, while at the same time—precisely because it is addressed uniformly to all and therefore admits no tolerant "agreement to disagree"—introducing a new cleavage between those caught up in this truth and those who refuse it.

#### Radical questioning produces new forms of politics—any past failures are reasons to re-dedicate ourselves and resist the savage and destructive nihilism of status quo politics.

**Badiou, 02** (Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland Translated/Interviewed by Christoph Cox & Molly Whalen, Issue #5, Winter 01/02, <http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/5/alainbadiou.php>, On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou).

It is necessary to examine, in a detailed way, the contemporary theory of Evil, the ideology of human rights, the concept of democracy. It is necessary to show that **nothing there leads in the direction of the real emancipation of humanity**. It is necessary to reconstruct rights, in everyday life as in politics, of Truth and of the Good. **Our ability to once again have real ideas and real projects depends on it.** You say that, for liberal capitalism, evil is always elsewhere, the dreaded other, something that liberal capitalism believes it has thankfully banished and kept at bay. ... My position is obviously that this "reasoning" is purely illusory ideology. First, liberal capitalism is not at all the Good of humanity. Quite the contrary; it is the vehicle of savage, destructive nihilism. Second, the Communist revolutions of the 20th century have represented grandiose efforts to create a completely different historical and political universe. Politics is not the management of the power of the State. Politics is first the invention and the exercise of an absolutely new and concrete reality. Politics § Marked 17:58 § is the creation of thought. The Lenin who wrote What is to be Done?, the Trotsky who wrote History of the Russian Revolution, and the Mao Zedong who wrote On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People are intellectual geniuses, comparable to Freud or Einstein. Certainly, the politics of emancipation, or egalitarian politics, have not, thus far, been able to resolve the problem of the power of the State. They have exercised a terror that is finally useless. But that should encourage us to pick up the question where they left it off, rather than to rally to the capitalist, imperialist enemy.

## 1NR

### T

**The aff will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract – we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation**

**Ignatieff 4—Prof of Human Rights @ Harvard**

Michael, *Lesser Evils*p. 20-1

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war.There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases**.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctionsbetween theseare clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standardsis that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

### 1NR – Our FW Good

**The alt to our framework – causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism.**

**Boggs, 2k**

(Carol, Professor of Political Science, Southern California, “The Ends of Politics, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar asthose injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothingother than a process of everyday muddling-through,then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simplygives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’sBurkean muddling-through theories.